II. The Transcendental Character of Geometry
In the second edition Preface to the first Critique, Kant says his "Copernican revolution"
proceeds "in accordance with the example set by the geometers and physicists" [K2:xxii].
Their example (together with the logicians [viii-ix] is appealing because in Kant's opinion logic, mathematics and physics have all "entered upon the secure path of a science" [vii] , precisely because they "have to determine their objects a priori" [x] --an insight which may seem strange to us, since "science" is now normally considered to be primarily empirical, but which is crucial in understanding Kant's intentions. Kant clearly regards the established (Euclidean, Aristotelian and Newtonian) models as having attained a kind of absolute certainty, but this does not mean, as is generally assumed, that he therefore rejects the possibility of other, equally valid models being developed. 4 On the contrary, as we shall see, Kant's contribution was to show that these classical models can be regarded as absolutely valid only when certain limitations are placed on them, by viewing them from a particular perspective. Indeed, two sentences after referring to his use of geometers and physicists as exemplars, he adds that "pure speculative reason has this peculiarity, that it can measure its powers according to the different ways in which it chooses the objects of its thinking [i.e. its different perspectives on objects]" [K2:xxiii, emphasis added].
And this should serve at least as a hint that Kant intends his System to provide a philosophical basis for regarding geometry, logic, and physics as capable of different, but equally valid, nontranscendental formulations.
An even clearer hint comes in Kant's first published writing (1747), when he poses the problem: "The ground of the threefold dimension of space is still unknown" [K1:23] . He admits that the law which determines that space "has the property of threefold dimension...is arbitrary, and that God could have chosen another... law [from which] an extension with other properties and dimensions would have arisen. A science of all these possible kinds of space would undoubtedly be the highest enterprise which a finite understanding could undertake in the field of geometry" [24] . He suggests the law in question might be "that the strength of the action [of substances] holds inversely as the square of the distances" [24] . However, he clearly recognizes that "the necessity of the threefold dimension" is not a logical necessity, "but rather...a certain other necessity which I am not as yet in a position to explain" [23] . His suggestions in this initial inquiry, he says, "may serve as an outline of an inquiry which I have in prospect" [25] . Thirty-four years later this "prospect" finally became a reality! The necessity of the three-dimensional nature of space is explained in K2 as resulting from the fact that space is the pure form of our sensible intuition [K2: [37] [38] [39] [40] [41] [42] [43] [44] [45] . Martin gives a detailed account of the mathematical implications of this theory. He explains that the intuitive character of mathematics means, for Kant, "that mathematics is limited to objects which can be constructed" [M1:23] . In other words, Kant's mature position is that intuition "limits the broader region of logical existence...to the narrower region of mathematical existence" [25] .
Nevertheless, Kant did not give up his early insight regarding the logical possibility of nonEuclidean geometries: "there can be no doubt that it was clear to Kant that in geometry the field of what is logically possible extends far beyond that of Euclidean geometry" [23] . Indeed, he claims that "under the Kantian presuppositions it is not only possible but necessary to assume the existence of non-Euclidean geometries" [18] . Martin adds: "Non-Euclidean geometries are logically possible but they cannot be constructed; hence they have no [real] mathematical existence for Kant and are mere figments of thought."5 What Martin and other commentators fail to recognize is that, just because they are "figments of thought" does not mean that a Kantian must immediately reject non-Euclidean geometries as useless speculation. His main point is not that they are physically impossible, but that it is impossible to form an image or picture of what they would look like. Thus, after arguing in K1 that multi-dimensional physical spaces are logically possible, Kant adds the important qualification that "in anything representable through the imagination in spatial terms, the fourth [spatial dimension] is an impossibility" [K1:23]. He then connects them directly to the Leibnizian conception of many possible "worlds", which, he argues, can be regarded as not just possible, but "probable", only on the assumption "that those many kinds of space, of which I have just spoken, are likewise possible" [K1:25]. Kant is not here making a positive claim about the real existence of non-Euclidean geometries, but only suggesting that we keep an open mind (which, on the traditional interpretation, he himself did not do). Before we investigate in more detail this issue of the conceptual status of non-Euclidean geometries, let us examine the actual importance of Euclidean geometry to the overall validity of Kant's System.
In the Aesthetic of K2 Kant seems to argue at several points from the validity of Euclidean geometry to the transcendental ideality of space. He says in K2:41, for example, that "geometrical properties are one and all apodeictic, that is, they are bound up with the consciousness of their necessity; for instance, that space has only three dimensions." 6 Thus, he argues, "the only explanation that makes intelligible the possibility of geometry" is that space is a formal condition of experience, imposed on objects by the human mind. Later, he hinges his argument again on a similar reference to the need to explain the apodeictic certainty of mathematical propositions, a type of certainty which "is not to be found in the a posteriori"
[K2:57]. And in K2:64-66 he provides his most lengthy argument of this sort: he takes the certainty of geometrical propositions as the starting-point (presupposed on the basis of his arguments in K2: [14] [15] [16] [17] , and argues that this requires us to regard space as a "pure a priori intuition". Although Euclid is never mentioned by name in the entire Critique, such passages clearly indicate that Kant believed Euclidean geometry had attained a kind of certainty and necessity which places it beyond question.
As a result, Strawson argues that in the Aesthetic "the doctrine of the transcendental subjectivity of space rests on no other discernible support that [sic] that provided by the argument from geometry"!7 Kant himself, however, does not present the few brief arguments "from geometry" as proofs of his theory of space, but rather he presents his theory of space as a support for a proper explanation of the necessity of geometrical propositions. The difference really rests on a different conception of the importance of arguments in the philosophical task itself: analytic philosophers such as Strawson regard a good theory as one that is based on good arguments; synthetic philosophers such as Kant, by contrast, regard a good argument as one which arises out of a good theory. In other words, Kant's arguments "from geometry" are not intended to serve as the basis for anything; rather, they are intended to demonstrate that a "Copernican" view of space as transcendentally ideal--i.e., as a subjective, a priori form of experience--provides the basis for an explanation of the otherwise inexplicable necessity of geometrical propositions.
Moreover, Kant does not take an entirely uncritical attitude towards Euclidean geometry.
He uses it in the above-mentioned ways not because he has no other way to defend his theory of the transcendental ideality of space, but because the consensus of opinion in his day was that Euclidean geometry was undeniably true; hence it could be taken as an unproblematic premise in a way which would be impossible today. However, as we shall see, that very change is due in large part to Kant. For even though he takes the certainty of geometrical propositions as the starting point for a few of his arguments, his conclusion denies the validity of the traditional belief that such propositions apply to a physical reality called "absolute space" [K2:54-56].
Therefore, rather than siding with the consensus of opinion on the relevance (or irrelevance) of Kant's theory of geometry for contemporary philosophy of science, we must now look more closely at the perspective from which he regards geometrical propositions to be necessarily true.
Is Kant assuming in the Aesthetic that Euclidean geometry provides the true explanation of the real structure of physical space? Let us look more closely at Kant's actual position. Kant concludes his "Transcendental Exposition of the Concept of Space" with a summary, which is intended to serve as a warning:
The transcendental concept of appearances in space...is a critical reminder that nothing intuited in space is a thing in itself, that space is not a form inhering in things in themselves..., and that what we call outer objects are nothing but mere representations of our sensibility, the form of which is space. The true correlate of sensibility, the thing in itself, is not known, and cannot be known, through these representations; and in experience no question is ever asked in regard to it. [K2: 45, emphasis added] Here Kant is clearly warning the reader not to regard the arguments of the Aesthetic, which adopt the transcendental perspective, as applying also to the empirical perspective. For, as he puts it quite bluntly, the sorts of questions he asks in this part of the Critique would not even arise if we limited our attention to the empirical perspective. Yet this warning has been overlooked or ignored by most of Kant's critics, with the result that Kant's position in the Aesthetic is probably the most frequently rejected part of the entire Critical System.
One of the most unfortunate results of the tendency to ignore Kant's warning against neglecting the perspectival character of his arguments is that he is interpreted as saying that Euclidean geometry is necessarily true of the physical world. In fact, a careful reading of the Aesthetic reveals that he never says anything of the kind! Rather, his whole argument is intended to draw the reader away from such empirical questions and towards questions concerning what is "bound up with [human] consciousness", and is therefore "apodeictic"
[K2:41] in a completely non-physical (or meta-physical) way. The Aesthetic can only be understood as presenting a coherent argument once we recognize that in it Kant is not doing physics! Rather, he expects us to join with him in limiting our attention to the transcendental perspective. Viewing it in this way enables us to see that Kant is using geometry as an example--a test case--and not as an essential element in his system. Kant himself makes this quite clear when he introduces his argument from geometry in K2:64-66 in the following way:
"To make this certainty [i.e. the certainty of his view that space is an a priori form of intuition] completely convincing, we shall select a case by which the validity of the position adopted will be rendered obvious..." [K2:64-65]. Obviously, he does not think the transcendental ideality of space depends at all on the validity of Euclidean geometry, but rather, vice versa! In what sense, then, does Kant believe Euclidean geometry can rightfully claim apodeictic certainty? Certainly not, as is often assumed, by pointing to the empirical world and saying "See, it's true!" That would be to remain in the empirical perspective, which, as he says in K2:A24, can only tell us about "the contingent character of perception". Rather, its necessity can be explained only from the transcendental perspective: only by regarding geometrical propositions as describing the way in which we must present space to ourselves in our sensible experience. Kant is arguing that Euclidean geometry describes the form of our perception of things in space, not the way they are actually related. And this, as we shall see, is not only plausible even today, but it leaves open a place for other geometries which might adapt the Euclidean model in such a way that it can apply to empirical reality itself (i.e. to the physics of space).
Just what, then, is Kant's attitude towards the empirical applicability of Euclidean geometry, and how important is the Euclidean structure of physical space to the validity of Kant's theory? Moreover, what exactly does Kant mean by his doctrines of "outer sense" and "pure intuition"? Kant begins his explanation in K2:37 by saying: "By means of outer sense, a property of our mind, we represent to ourselves objects as outside us, and all without exception in space." This "metaphysical exposition" is not intended to describe the way we experience space or objects in space; that would be an empirical concern. Rather, it is intended to describe the nature of the human subject. Without straying into the difficult subject of the meaning of "pure intuition",8 we can point out that one of the main points Kant is making in the Aesthetic is that, viewed from the transcendental perspective, space and time are two distinct forms of sensibility inhering in the human subject, despite the fact that in experience we always find them together. (The significance of this point will be discussed in section III.) The real thrust of Kant's argument is simply to point out that transcendental reflection requires us to distinguish between these two sources of material for knowledge, and to recognize that each, viewed separately, has a fixed, predetermined form. But this form is transcendental and relates to appearances; it is valid, therefore, "only in us" [K2:59] , and leaves open the question of whether or not exactly the same forms will hold true when objects are regarded from the empirical perspective as being "outside us" [as in K2:37; see also 275-276].
According to Kant, therefore, Euclid's geometrical system is a transcendental abstraction from actual experience, and only because of this fact--not because the world is "really" structured in this way--can his system claim certainty and necessity. Kant is claiming that if we abstract space and time separately from our experience of the real (empirical) world, and consider the necessary requirements for perception, then the resulting picture of this abstract, spatial world (as opposed to the empirical world of space-time) will be Euclidean.
Kant regards this as a kind of "brute fact" about how the human mind is structured [see e.g. agree that the only world we can "picture" with our imagination, and so also the ordinary world as we see it, is Euclidean.9
If, then, we assume that Kant was correct in his assumption that our sensibility is limited to a Euclidean picture of the world, what are the implications of this theory for geometers themselves? Kant's view is that the Euclidean nature of space is actually a transcendental condition for the very possibility of our perception of space, so that spatial objects viewed as appearances must assume this form. But Kant clearly understands that this transcendental perspective is primarily of interest to the philosopher; if Kant had ever had the opportunity to share his lunch with an Einstein, he would have readily admitted that the scientist is fully justified in viewing the world empirically, so that physical objects can be treated as independent "things in themselves".10 This implies that the geometer (or physicist) who accepts Kant's transcendental perspective does not need to assume that the physical world itself conforms to the way we must view it. That is, Kant's theory, by clearly distinguishing between the transcendental and empirical perspectives, and by associating Euclidean geometry exclusively with the former, actually raises the question as to whether or not some alternative geometry, though not picturable to our sensibility, might conform more closely to the way objects are actually structured in (empirically) real space.
The chief objection against this interpretation of Kant's intentions is, no doubt, that it flies in the face of the almost universally accepted assumption that Kant is trying to guarantee the applicability of Euclidean geometry to the physical world. Unfortunately, Kant himself never clearly states just what his intentions are in this respect. As a result, the way of reading Kant which was natural in the eighteenth century, when the question of the actual structure of the physical world would hardly be raised by most readers, because Euclidean geometry was generally accepted as unquestionably true, has become the traditional interpretation of Kant's own intentions, and has never been significantly challenged. Thus, for example, when Kant says in K2:121 that "the concepts of space and time", regarded as pure intuitions, "independently of all experience...make possible a synthetic knowledge of objects", the natural assumption is that "objects" here refers to real empirical objects. Yet this is not Kant's intention at all: the "objects" of which we have synthetic a priori knowledge by means of Euclidean geometry are exclusively appearances, and as such are viewed transcendentally.11
Strawson's analysis of Kant's theory of geometry provides a good example of the traditional interpretation. He explains that geometry can be viewed as relating either to a set of phenomenal (and thus unfalsifiable), pictures, or to the logic behind them, or to their application to objects in physical space. He states "that Kant's theory of pure intuition can be construed as a reasonable account of the nature of geometry in its phenomenal interpretation" [S1:284]. He then asserts that Kant intended "to use his insight into the necessities of phenomenal geometry to resolve... the difficulty created by the apparently necessary application of Euclidean geometry to physical space" [284] [285] . Thus, he continues, Kant's fundamental error...lay in not distinguishing between Euclidean geometry in its phenomenal interpretation and Euclidean geometry in its physical interpretations... Because he did not make this distinction, he supposed that the necessity which truly belongs to Euclidean geometry in its phenomenal interpretation also belongs to it in its physical interpretation. He thought that the geometry of physical space had to be identical with the geometry of phenomenal space. [285] Significantly, Strawson does not refer to a single text to support his acceptance of this traditional interpretation--i.e. his assumption that Kant's notion of pure intuition corresponds to phenomenal geometry and that its empirical application entails an identification of physical geometry with phenomenal geometry. By contrast, if we regard transcendental geometry in the way I have suggested, then Kant's doctrine of pure intuition "accounts" for phenomenal geometry only in the sense that it serves as its transcendental foundation. That is, the empirical application of pure intuition gives rise to phenomenal geometry, but is never directly related by Kant to physical space. Thus, Strawson's "fundamental error" lay in not distinguishing between Euclidean geometry as transcendental and Euclidean geometry as phenomenally applied.
Kant's silence on the subject of physical geometry need not be interpreted as an identification of phenomenal with physical, but may simply reflect his recognition that physical geometry (as a posteriori) is a subject which need not be addressed by the transcendental philosopher. Motion of an object in space does not belong to a pure science, and consequently not to geometry. For the fact that something is movable cannot be known a priori, but only through experience. Motion, however, considered as the describing of a space, is a pure act of the successive synthesis of the manifold in outer intuition in general by means of the productive imagination, and belongs not only to geometry, but even to transcendental philosophy. Kant's main point (which Strawson ignores) is that "pure [i.e. a priori] science" must be carefully distinguished from applied, or empirical science, so that once "facts" such as some particular motion are taken into consideration, we are no longer even talking about geometry (whether Euclidean or non-Euclidean).12 In other words, Kant seems to be saying in this footnote that the applicability of geometry to objects in physical space is a problem which lies outside the bounds of geometry (and transcendental philosophy)! And this implies, of course, that Euclidean (or any other pure) geometry does not necessarily hold true of physical objects when they are viewed as objects of empirical science. This interpretation of K2:155n makes sense only if we remember that Kant defines geometry as "a science which determines the properties of space synthetically, and yet a priori" [K2:40; see also 120]. Given this definition, of course, Kant could not admit any nonEuclidean geometries, because both of the types of geometry which Russell describes (viz. logical and physical [see note 11]) would not count as "geometry" in Kant's special sense. Only Euclidean geometry is synthetic and a priori, so only it is relevant to the transcendental philosopher. When this is understood, the question of whether or not physical space is Euclidean can be seen in its proper perspective, as a side issue relating not to the validity of transcendental philosophy, but only to the question of the significance of Euclidean geometry for empirical science.
III. The Empirical Application of Transcendental Geometry
Does this mean that the traditional interpretation of Kant, according to which he is attempting to give a transcendental guarantee that Euclidean geometry must be true of the physical world, is a groundless myth? Certainly not, for there are many passages in which Kant is indeed saying something along these lines. A prime example comes in the section entitled , and yet to preserve some degree of autonomy for the empirical scientist (an autonomy which in other passages Kant seems to uphold)? Such questions did not occur to Kant, because the science of his day had not yet fully claimed its autonomy (from philosophy) as a thoroughly empirical discipline; hence Euclid's "transcendental" geometry was still believed by nearly all scientists and philosophers to be the last word on empirical matters as well. Kant was clearly influenced by his tradition in a way for which he can hardly be blamed. The important point, however, is that the perspectival character of his System points us directly to a way of supplementing his own explicit views in order to account for the modern developments. In this section I will attempt to demonstrate just how this can be done.
Kant in all likelihood believed Euclidean geometry to give a true account of the structure of the physical world. Nevertheless, even if we would now prefer a non-Euclidean account, the essential structure of his theoretical system can remain in tact, once we realize that the form of our sensible perception of objects in space, when all time-considerations are abstracted, is indeed necessarily Euclidean. And in this phenomenal sense, as a description of how we perceive the world, Euclid's system is regarded as correct even today. How, then, can a physical theory of curved space, with its corresponding non-Euclidean geometry, be compatible with the phenomenal validity of Euclidean geometry? Kant provides us with a way of solving this difficult problem.
When Kant says in K2:206 that the geometry of pure intuition is "undeniably valid" for empirical intuition as well, he is not denying that the physicist can conceive of a non-Euclidean geometry which actually holds true for aspects of space which human beings cannot perceive.
On the contrary, the objects of "empirical intuition", which he is claiming must necessarily conform to Euclidean geometry, are objects of "possible experience", by which Kant means "objects which are within the range of human perception". And the fact which is too often neglected in most accounts of Kant's supposedly miserable failure to foretell the future by providing for modern scientific advances is that these advances all have to do with "viewing" physical objects in their extreme manifestations--i.e. quantities which are either too small for human beings to perceive (as, e.g., in quantum physics) or too large for human beings to perceive (as, e.g., in the application of relativity theory to astrophysics). Yet, giving proper emphasis to this fact enables us to locate the real problem in Kant's view, which is simply that he failed to acknowledge that the objects of empirical science are not limited to perceivable objects. In other words, Kant's analysis of the limits of human knowledge neglected to consider the status of empirical sciences which experiment with quantities too small or too large ever to be intuited by the human sensibility. For example, the modern theory of physical space as "curved" is based on conceptions and calculations, not on perceptions of a space which actually appears curved. By simply recognizing that physical science does not always require direct intuition of the objects on which it experiments, we can therefore reconcile the modern views concerning the geometry of physical space with Kant's view of the transcendental necessity of our perception of Euclidean space.
Moreover, in the geometry of curved space, the perspective-lessness of the observer (or the unobservability of the perspective) is of utmost importance. For in order to perceive our space as curved, we would have to be able to observe it from the standpoint of some other space (outside of our own space) which is not curved. And this is precisely Kant's point about what man cannot do: his doctrine of pure intuition is intended to drive home the fact that it is "solely from the human standpoint that we can speak of space" [K2:42]. The equivalent requirement in Euclidean geometry can be accomplished, however, by adopting, as it were, the standpoint of time and looking at space from this perspective as nontemporal.13 This, in Kantian terms, is the crucial difference between Euclidean and non-Euclidean conceptions of space: there is no human standpoint from which the latter can be perceived.
Thus, as we have already seen, Euclidean geometry is a (transcendental) abstraction from experience: it arises only when the subject, his motion and his time, are removed from observation (and in this sense, adopted as the standpoint). "Abstracting time" from our consideration of experience really means, therefore, regarding space as an object of spatial appearance--an intuited "picture" of the real world. In other words, Kant's theory is telling us that the human perceiver breaks experience up into temporal and spatial components: the reality we experience exists as a unified, space-time continuum; but the perceiver determines it in such a way that it appears to be Euclidean. Thus, the empirical object viewed from the transcendental perspective as in us (i.e. as an appearance) is Euclidean, even though that same object viewed from the empirical perspective as outside us (i.e. as a phenomenon in space-time) might be non-Euclidean.
When the scientist intentionally refuses to submit to the natural human tendency to perceive time and space as separate (i.e. refuses to let the inner-outer distinction influence his science), then the problem of determining the structure of space is immediately transformed from a static, transcendental inquiry, into a dynamic, empirical inquiry. (As a result, space is, in a sense, dehumanized.) Any resulting non-Euclidean theory of space is bound to be "counter-intuitive" (i.e. not picturable) for precisely the reasons Kant gives in his defence of the transcendental character of Euclidean space: since Euclidean geometry is, as Kant argued, the form of our intuition of space, other geometries can never be perceived, but only conceived, even if we subsequently discover that a non-Euclidean explanation, though purely conceptual, nevertheless enables us to explain certain phenomena better than a Euclidean one. This is because the other theories can be drawn out from experience, but are not read into experience by the human subject. For this very reason (i.e. by definition) only Euclidean geometry can be both synthetic (true of our abstract, nontemporal representation of our experience) and a priori (deriving its truth from a source other than experience); the synthetic applicability of all other geometries can be known only a posteriori (after collecting data based on cumulative experiments). In other words, our knowledge of the applicability of any non-Euclidean geometry will be contingent because it presupposes experience, whereas that of Euclidean geometry is necessary because it prefigures experience. And this is why Kant claims that no non-Euclidean geometry can exist (i.e. can have real possibility): because it would have to be a posteriori, and therefore could not be pure (so it would not be a true "geometry" according to his definition).
What is almost always ignored in discussions of Kant's theory of geometry is that Kant himself makes some (very "modern") suggestions in the "Transcendental Dialectic" of K2 concerning the usefulness of just such non-intuitive theories for science. A theory which is conceptual but which contains no intuitable content cannot, he says, be regarded as establishing "empirical knowledge", but viewed as an "idea" it can serve as an hypothesis with definite heuristic value. He defines an "idea" as "a concept formed from notions and transcending the possibility of experience" [K2:377]. The "transcendental ideas", he explains, "determine according to principles how understanding is to be employed in dealing with experience in its totality" [378] . Kant's main effort in the Dialectic is, of course, to expose the fallacies which arise whenever such ideas are thought to constitute empirical knowledge. As a result, his lengthy appendix on "The Regulative Employment of the Ideas of Pure Reason" [670-698] is often ignored. In it he explains that ideas of reason can have a legitimate "immanent" use if we treat them "as if" they are true: "The hypothetical employment of reason is regulative only [not constitutive of knowledge]; its sole aim is, so far as may be possible, to bring unity into the body of our detailed knowledge" [675] . If Kant were alive today, it seems likely that he would apply this theory of ideas to any attempt to describe physical space as non-Euclidean. In other words, he would say that if a non-Euclidean concept of space enables scientists "to bring unity into the body of [their] detailed knowledge", then they are more than welcome (indeed, encouraged) to make such a conjecture, provided they never claim to have established empirical knowledge of its certain truth. And this seems to be quite an accurate account of the way modern scientists do view such theories! Returning now to the quote from K2:206, we can see that Kant is not, in fact, contradicting the perspectival interpretation which I have been defending. For his claim is that pure intuition determines the nature of empirical intuition; any consideration of empirical intuition assumes the transcendental perspective (that of the Aesthetic, where space and time are separately abstracted from experience), not the empirical perspective (that of the Analytic of Principles, where space and time are put back into experience, and where intuitions and concepts are synthesized by the imagination). And, as we have seen, Kant does not limit scientists to the empirical perspective, but encourages them to adopt the hypothetical perspective (that of the Dialectic, where concepts without intuitions are viewed as regulative ideas).14 So scientists who do not purport to be examining "objects of the senses" are not bound by Kant's theory to force the results of their inquiries into a Euclidean (sensible) mold.
IV. Concluding Remarks on Kant's Copernican Perspective
The novelty of this conclusion may be surprising at first; yet upon reflection it should be viewed as a natural implication of Kant's whole Copernican revolution. For his assumption that the subject determines (transcendentally) the perceived character of empirical objects always acts as a two-edged sword: he uses one edge to cut the traditional positions off from the domain to which they were formerly believed (erroneously) to apply; and with the other edge he protects those same positions from further attack by putting them in their proper place. Kant makes his dual motivations quite clear with respect to metaphysics, morality and religion in K2:xxx-xxxi. And there is no reason to suppose the implications of his Copernican perspective on geometry to be an exception. In fact, this Copernican perspective can be seen working in a remarkably similar way by comparing Kant's attitude towards Euclidean geometry with his attitude towards Aristotelian logic and Newtonian physics.15 However, such comparisons are beyond the scope of this paper.
Even in his earliest essay Kant shows an awareness of the perspectival distinction we have been examining: "body as mathematically conceived is a thing quite distinct from body as it exists in nature; and statements can be true of the former which cannot be extended to the 
